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Abstract
Professor Wisotsky: Mr. Justice Goldberg, in the case of Washington
v. Davis,1 a group of black applicants, unsuccessfully seeking
police positions on the District of Columbia Police Force, sued alleging
the entrance test, in effect, was racially discriminatory because they
failed at a rate much greater than white applicants.
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Professor Wisotsky: Mr. Justice Goldberg, in the case of Wash-
ington v. Davis,1 a group of black applicants, unsuccessfully seeking
police positions on the District of Columbia Police Force, sued alleging
the entrance test, in effect, was racially discriminatory because they
failed at a rate much greater than white applicants.
The Supreme Court rejected their claim, saying it wasn't enough
that they failed at a greater rate; there must be some showing of an
intention to discriminate against black people. Do you agree with that
decision?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: No, I don't agree with it at all. The most
difficult thing to do is establish the intention of local officials, including
members of the state legislature. I must confess I don't know about
Florida, but most states in our union keep no record of state legislative
proceedings. There certainly are no transcripts kept of proceedings of
local authorities.
In law we normally apply a simple rule about human conduct. We
say people are presumed to intend the logical, reasonable consequences
of their act. So to me the big question is "What is the effect of the
official's action?" not "What is the motivation?"
I recall a dissent I wrote in the reapportionment case Wright v.
Rockefeller.2 I discussed our inability to probe peoples' mental re-
cesses.' We have no tools to do that, and no local official would take
the stand to say "I was racially motivated." So I would judge by effect.
These decisions seem to me a way of ducking the primary issue.
* Former Justice of the United States Supreme Court. This article was adapted
from a videotaped interview with Mr. Justice Goldberg by Professors Michael Burns,
Robert Marsel and Steven Wisotsky of the Nova University Center for the Study of
Law. The interview took place at the Law Center on Sept. 16, 1980, when Mr. Justice
Goldberg was Nova's Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law.
1. 426 U.S. 299 (1976).
2. 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 73-74.
1
et al.: Stripping Away the Fictions: Interview With Mr. Justice Arthur J.
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
1 554 Nova Law Journal 6:1982
They resemble a situation we had when I was on the Court in Swain v.
Alabama.4 There, no black person had ever served on a jury for a white
defendant; blacks only served for a black defendant. This selective
elimination of black jurors was done through the guise of peremptory
challenges. To me it was a clear case of racial discrimination. I did not
exalt the right to exercise peremptory challenges, nowhere safeguarded
in the Constitution, over the right to equal treatment, which the Con-
stitution affords.
Professor Burns: Mr. Justice, in deciding whether females, like
blacks, should constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes,
we find ourselves attempting to compare the female experience in the
United States with the black experience. What are your observations?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Of course nothing can approximate the
way we treated the black population of this country; they were in slav-
ery. And our slavery, Professor Elkins reported in his book,5 was the
worst slavery in the North and South American continents. We permit-
ted families to be separated; children, wives and husbands were sold
separately. In South America, thanks primarily to the Jesuit Church,
that practice was not permitted, even though they had slavery.8
On the other hand, women are grossly discriminated against to
this day. As a former Secretary of Labor, I can say women are still
paid substantially less than men for the same jobs. We must recognize
that while for many centuries women were not held in physical bond-
age as slaves, there were many inhibitions against women's freedom.
It's only recently that states have begun adopting a law which
should have been long obvious: a woman can accuse her husband of
rape. We never allowed that before. So if you read the Forsyte Saga,
you recall the famous incident where this man of property, Soames
Forsyte, virtually raped his wife.8 He ruined his marriage by doing so.
Women have traditionally sustained substantial handicaps. They
4. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
5. S. ELKINS, SLAVERY (1963).
6. Id. at 69-73.
7. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(a) (Deering Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14-5(b) (West Supp. 1981).
8. "Soames had exercised his rights over an estranged and unwilling wife in the
greatest-the supreme act of property." J. GALSWORTHY, THE FORSYTE SAGA 373
(Grove ed. 1935).
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were denied the right to vote until we had a constitutional amendment.'
They were denied the right to hold property in many states. Now,
much has been corrected; but there is no doubt at this very minute
women are not treated on an equal basis with men.
That being so, I believe the Court should opt for a suspect classifi-
cation. In our jurisprudence it is not necessary to absolutely equate the
enormity of black discrimination and gender discrimination. If discrim-
ination is substantial, the Court has a right to move. I regret the Court
hasn't done that. It had a duty to say the class is suspect. This doesn't
mean compelling reasons may not justify some differences: health stan-
dards and the like. But the failure of the Court to fulfill what I con-
ceive to be its constitutional duty has resulted in the Equal Rights
Amendment ° and has led me to support the amendment.
Professor Burns: One controversial focus of the women's move-
ment, shared by American blacks and Jews, among others, is the chal-
lenge to exclusionary admission policies of men's clubs. I think we can
find these clubs serve as the situs for developing male friendships and
ultimately impact on decision-making in business and government. Are
there any viable constitutional bases for challenging these admission
policies?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I would think so. I wrote an opinion once,11
trying to form a majority, in which I said one has a right to be pri-
vately prejudiced; I commented on clubs to gain support for the opin-
ion. Right now I am engaged in an effort to overcome this prejudice in
Washington's Cosmos Club, where women are only admitted as spouses
rather than in their own right. Presently, a cabinet secretary like Patri-
cia Harris cannot enter unless her husband is admitted.
. What is the constitutional basis for ending such admission polcies?
I think several factors activate fourteenth amendment prohibitions.
Most clubs enjoy tax exempt status; thus the state is involved. More-
over, clubs benefit from many municipal services, e.g., garbage collec-
tion, water service and many others; it would seem there is the requisite
degree of state involvement essential for an attack on discriminatory
treatment.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
10. U.S. CONST. proposed amend. XXVI.
11. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Professor Burns: The right of privacy, while now well estab-
lished, remains unenumerated and, in the minds of some, remains all
too fluid. One controversial area concerns extending the right of pri-
vacy from the traditional marriage and family context to the area of
private homosexual conduct. Do you believe laws which prohibit private
homosexual conduct violate the constitutional right of privacy?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I do, for adults and consensual relation-
ships between adults. I do not apply this rationale to children. We have
many laws where special regard is paid to children, and rightly so.
Children do not possess the judgment to make informed decisions.
Adults, unless they inflict harm on others, have the right to pursue
privacy, to pursue their own lives. Now, homosexuality is something I
personally do not favor; but I regard it as a psychological and social
problem. I don't quite agree with those who say it's a way of life which
should be endorsed, but I do agree it's a private matter between
adults. 2
Professor Burns: As a Justice known for having great respect for
personal individual liberties, and having a unique international perspec-
tive as a former United Nations ambassador, to what extent to you
believe the recent Haitian and Cuban refugees should be afforded con-
stitutonal rights?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I believe they have substantial constitu-
tional rights. As always, we must refer to the fourteenth amendment
which states: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The notable thing about
the fourteenth amendment, echoing the fifth amendment, is the term
"any person." When a person comes to our country we can, through
the application of the immigration laws, deny admission. When a per-
son enters illegally, we can deport the person.
Throughout our early history we have had great waves of immi-
gration, dating back to the founding fathers, the pilgrims. We have
12. I have been told I approved of laws of this type in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); but I did not. I did quote John
Harlan, who used the word homosexual. Id. at 499 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 553 (1961)). Often when one Justice quotes another Justice, he does it to garner
votes. Harlan liked his former dissent, and he was right in result. But I merely quoted
him in my opinion.
4
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enacted amnesty laws permitting immigrants to stay if they entered
before a certain date. But in modern times, the recent influx represents
something sui generis in our country. In spite of the Coast Guard's
disapproval, we have permitted Cubans and Haitians to enter; they're
here. In my opinion we cannot regard them as illegal immigrants. We
are in large part a nation of political refugees; it's our heritage.
Except for a hard core criminal element, who arrived through false
pretenses and have been segregated, the Cubans and Haitians who have
arrived are now within our jurisdiction. I would brush aside the techni-
cality of whether they're permanent residents or not. We have admitted
them; and having admitted them the fourteenth amendment applies.
I'd like to illustrate by a simple analogy. Could anybody deny that
if a Cuban or Haitian were charged with a criminal offense he would
be entitled to the constitutional safeguards of a fair trial, the appoint-
ment of counsel, and the other constitutional guarantees? Of course he
would be entitled to them. So I believe in facing this new situation we
should say, and I hope the Court would say, the immigration laws ap-
ply but are subject to the fourteenth amendment. We've allowed the
people to enter and we must give them constitutional safety.
I would like to make another point. I see no basis for distinguish-
ing between Cuban and Haitian refugees. The fourteenth amendment
says no person in our jurisdiction shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws. The Cubans or Haitians, once here, should be treated
equally.
Professor Burns: Mr. Justice, constitutional law students, and I
include myself, have never fully understood the ebb and flow in popu-
larity of the three prongs of the fourteenth amendment. Some have
suggested the equal protection clause has been stretched as far as will
be tolerated, and the privileges or immunities clause is being rejuve-
nated. What do you think?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Well, I take the amendment as a whole; I
do not like the idea that one part is preferred to another part. Indeed I
would have overruled the Slaughter-House Cases13 which virtually
wrote the privileges or immunities clause out of the Constitution. That
clause means something; every word in the Constitution means some-
thing. I do not prefer the clause of the fourteenth amendment which
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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says "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the citizens" over the clause which says
"persons," as I said earlier. I believe every person legally in our coun-
try, or recognized to be here, is entitled to all constitutional safeguards.
Professor Wisotsky: Mr. Justice Goldberg, the public opinion
polls show a large proportion of Americans support capital punishment.
In the face of that support, would you be prepared to rule the death
penalty . . unconstitutional?14
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I think it's clearly unconstitutional. The
fact that a transient majority will, from time to time, say yes or no does
not determine constitutional questions. About fifteen years ago a poll
showed that Americans, by an overwhelming number were prepared to
repeal the whole Bill of Rights. Watergate later brought the American
public to recognize the Bill of Rights is designed for the protection of
all of us, against government and against majorities.
The arguments against capital punishment were pretty well devel-
oped in Great Britain by the Royal Commission. 5 Its finding was a
simple one, unexpected by many advocates of abolition. After close
scrutiny of Great Britain's experience, the Commission found that the
death penalty neither deterred nor failed to deter people from commit-
ting crimes. The deterrent element could be neither sustained nor
defeated.
This is basically what I found in my own analysis expounded in
Rudolph v. Alabama,8 the first decision where a Justice expressed
doubts about the death penalty. I agree with the Commission because
most murders are family murders, or are due to drunkenness, drugs or
passion. Members of the criminal syndicate are rarely indicted for mur-
der, although they are indicted for drugs or other offenses. Without
conclusive, compelling proof that the death penalty actually deters
murder-a basic requirement, it seems to me, in the administration of
criminal justice-it should not be imposed, because of the finality of
the penalty.
14. The Gallup Poll, Nov. 12-15, 1980, taken nationally, returned the following
figures: In favor of the Death Penalty for murderers ... 54%
Opposed to the Death Penalty ... 43%
Don't Know ... 3%
15. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 (1953).
16. 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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Also, for me, the institutionalization of taking human life by the
state is a dreadful thing. It puts the state's imprimatur upon killing. I
would have thought as a result of the Vietnam War, and our reflections
upon that terrible incident in American history, we have had too much
killing and should follow a different path.
Professor Marsel: Mr. Justice, turning to the first amendment,
just a few years ago there was a planned Nazi march in Skokie, Illi-
nois. Do you believe this sort of thing is protected by the first
amendment?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: No, I don't, not under the precedents. In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,17 Justice Murphy, writing for the
whole Court, said there are such things as fighting words which are not
protected. He referred back to Justice Holmes' famous statement "you
shall not call fire in a crowded theater."18 In Chaplinsky, the whole
Court, including Justices Black and Douglas, decided the words "you're
a damn fascist," and "you're a damn racketeer"1 9 were outside the am-
bit of first amendment protection.
People express themselves in various ways, by words and by cer-
tain types of conduct. I regard marching with Nazi uniforms in a
predominantly Jewish neighborhood consisting of a large number of
refugees to be the equivalent of fighting words. But in deference to the
first amendment, I say the marchers must be afforded a suitable way to
express their message, benighted as it is. They don't have to march in
that particular area; they can march elsewhere. Unless we overrule
Chaplinsky, the Court's decision governs in spades.
Professor Marsel: Mr. Justice, you mentioned Justice Black. He
said he had an absolutist view of the first amendment.20 Do you agree
with that? How do you reconcile that view with the "time, place and
manner" restrictions? 21
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Justice Black was my dear friend and I
don't think he had an absolutist view. He said he did, but Chaplinsky
17. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
18. Id. at 571 n.2 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
19. 315 U.S. at 574.
20. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 & n.10 (1961) (Black,
J., dissenting).
21. E.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 311 (1974); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941).
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showed he did not. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners2 2 Black
recognized the right of bar associations to investigate people, but not
for political reasons. The first amendment has never been construed to
cover only political speech, as Dr. Meiklejohn argued. 3 I think it was
originally designed for that, but we soon recognized the difficulty of
separating novels and other works from political tracts. Gulliver's
Travels is a political document. So are Charles Dickens' books. So is
John Steinbeck's work. You can find examples through the whole his-
tory of literature.
Where Justice Black and Justice Douglas asserted absolutist views
most vigorously in more recent years was in the obscenity area. These
Justices have, in effect, said: since Congress shall make no law, and
since the fourteenth amendment applies the prohibition to the states,
anything goes. Well of course, our founding fathers would shudder to
discover that they, those puritans, countenanced obscenity in the Con-
stitution. The only real justification for Douglas' and Black's position is
not absolutism, as they say, because their own record in Chaplinsky
proves otherwise; it is the inability of the Court to define the word "ob-
scene." Most obscenity cases involve criminal statutes; people are enti-
tled to reasonable notice of what is obscene. Justice Stewart said: I
don't know how to define it, "[b]ut I know it when I see it." '24 That's a
very poor test for constitutional adjudication.
So again, we're in an area, like the homosexual area, where, like it
or not, we may have to allow a large amount of freedom for adults. But
not for children, who are much more impressionable than adults.
The Supreme Court muddied the waters by its so-called local com-
munity standards.25 With all due respect to the Court, that's absurd in
my opinion. The Constitution of the United States applies throughout
the country. You cannot have one constitutional rule in Fort Lauder-
dale and another constitutional rule in San Francisco. That would be
an absurdity. And the absurdity was demonstrated with the film, Car-
nal Knowledge. The Justices were confronted with a movie which they
all recognized as not obscene under any standard of the test, so they
22. 353 U.S. 232 (1957); see also Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
23. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment'is an Absolute, 1961 SUPREME COURT
REVIEW 245, 249 (Kurland ed. 1961).
24. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
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applied a national standard. 6
It seems to me there can be only one standard, a national stan-
dard. Although I supported the Roth test, the "utterly without redeem-
ing social importance" test,27 today, upon more mature reflection, I
would say adults should be able to do what they want in the obscenity
area. But this does not apply to children.
Professor Wisotsky: Mr. Justice, continuing our inquiry about
the first amendment, there is a lot of friction between members of the
public and certain religious groups, such as Hari Krishnas, members of
the Unification Church and others who solicit and proselytize in public
places such as airports. Do you think they are within their rights or do
members of the public have a right not to be distfirbed?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I have never understood this argument, to
be very frank. I don't think there is a first amendment right for any
religious group to solicit contributions in an airport. I think they have a
right to do it on the public sidewalk. On this point we are unanimous in
Cox v. Louisiana.28 I said there is no constitutional right to hold a
street meeting at rush hour in the middle of Times Square if another
place is provided, such as Central Park or elsewhere, where any group
can exercise its protest and right of free speech.29
Now an airport is designed for passengers, and it is often crowded.
Passengers have a right to accomplish their business; the airport has a
right to conduct its business. If the Hari Krishnas have a right to solicit
there, then the Catholic Church would have the right to conduct a
Mass at an airport, which would run afoul of the first amendment's
provisions about establishment of a religion. Or a Jewish group would
have a right to assemble a minyan, a proper number of men, and con-
duct a prayer service. That's not what airports are for.
Let me put it another way: an airport is a government sanctioned
building supported by law. There are many government buildings. I
was Secretary of Labor, as I said earlier. I can see no first amendment
right to have the same groups solicit in the lobby of the Department of
Labor Building. That building is devoted to the business provided by
26. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
27. 354 U.S. at 484.
28. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
29. Id. at 554.
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law, to carry on the functions of the Department of Labor, to protect
working people, and to administer statutes designed for the protection
of labor. Airport buildings are for air transportation. Airports have
enough problems, including security problems; we shouldn't permit
these solicitors to become an impediment to the flow of commerce. The
last time I was in an airport I found six groups soliciting. And I found
posters stating the airport disclaimed any support, but was required to
allow these groups to exercise their first amendment rights.
I think this is a time, place and manner problem. As long as a
reasonable place is provided for these groups to solicit and proselytize,
the airport should be devoted to the business of selling tickets, process-
ing long lines of people, and boarding passengers on the planes.
Professor Marsel: Mr. Justice, Justice Frankfurter was a great
exponent of judicial restraint. What's your assessment of his
philosophy?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I never believed very much in that philos-
ophy, because it is not a philosophy of general application. There is
great room for judicial restraint in the form of non-intervention with
social and economic legislation. It's not the business of the courts to
decide those matters reserved to Congress and the states. As we said
when I was on the Court, in Ferguson v. Skrupka,30 the Court is not a
super legislature. There is a non-intervention policy beyond judicial
restraint.
On the other hand, there is an area where the courts are compelled
to intervene, and intervene actively, and that area is protection.of the
fundamental rights, guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, of those who
live in our country. That's why the Bill of Rights was adopted. There's
no excuse for not being an activist in protecting those constitutional
rights.
The Bill of Rights is lawyers' material, judges' material. Lawyers
and judges understand the legal process, the right of counsel and the
right of fair trial. Essentially the Bill of Rights is a number of procedu-
ral provisions. But the Court has had trouble with the one substantive
provision of the Bill of Rights, the first amendment, in obscenity cases
and establishment of religion cases.
But I actually distrust judicial activism. I prefer judicial courage
30. 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss4/1
Stripping Away The Fictions
to vindicate rights. The most activist Court in the history of the Su-
preme Court, the 1930 Court, was also the most erroneous. Among the
worst decisions of the Supreme Court are those in which the 1930
Court invalidated all of the New Deal legislation until Justice Roberts
switched his vote.
Professor Marsel: It sounds as if you've been describing the role
the Supreme Court is supposed to play in the United States. Perhaps
you can compare what the Warren Court did with what the Burger
Court did. How do you assess the two courts?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I would say the indicia of the Warren
Court was its willingness to be forthright in protection of fundamental
rights, starting with Brown v. Board of Education,31 Fay v. Noia,3 2 the
habeas corpus decision, Reynolds v. Sims, 33 and others. The character-
istic of those decisions was not merely judicial courage. Many people,
Frankfurter among them, thought the court should stay out of the po-
litical thicket on reapportionment. But we entered the political thicket;
there's nothing new about that. De Tocqueville said the judicial resolu-
tion of political questions is fundamental in our republic.34 In America
there's scarcely a question which goes to court that isn't political in
nature; that's the nature of the Constitution. But the indicia of the
Warren Court was not only courage in vindicating human rights. It
was realism: Brush aside legal fictions.
For example, in Betts v. Brady,35 the Court said a criminal defen-
dant in a felony case could defend himself. The result was that al-
though theoretically everybody had the right to counsel, the poor
couldn't exercise that right. A poor defendant had to defend himself;
counsel was not provided. We overruled that situation in the famous
case of Gideon v. Wainwright.6 We said Betts was unrealistic.
I'll give you anbther illustration of the realism of the Warren
Court. The Warren Court itself decided, in Wolf v. Colorado,37 when
evidence was tainted becuase the government acted illegally, the court
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
33. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
34. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (P. Bradley ed. 1954).
35. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
36. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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would admit the evidence but would punish the constable. Some years
later the Court reviewed the situation and found nobody actually pun-
ished policemen, which may be justified. The few who were punished
were poor policemen who had overstepped the constitutional bounds
very greatly. Therefore the Warren Court, in Mapp v. Ohio,38 said the
only way to hold the government to proper standards (because as Bran-
deis said, "Government is . . .the omnipresent teacher . . . [f]or good
or evil" 39) was to adopt the rule: if evidence is illegally obtained by the
government, it is not admissible. That, in my opinion, is the nature of
the approach of the Warren Court.
The Burger Court is a departure from that concept. The pendulum
hasn't swung all the way back; but Fay v. Noia40 has been emascu-
lated. The defendant's right to have a federal court review state court
proceedings, when there is a violation of fundamental constitutional
rights, has been substantially undermined by recent decisions. I regret
that, because often in state court, there is not a full exploration of the
case, due to the nature of the counsel employed, or because the facts
haven't come sufficiently to light. By bringing habeas corpus actions
into federal court the defendant is finally afforded a full examination of
his case.
I remember a case, Townsend v. Sain,41 when I was on the Court.
A man addicted to drugs was charged with murder. According to nar-
cotics experts, an addict in the hands of authorities and doctors be-
comes quite malleable. The addict knows medical treatment can be
given or withheld. This man soon confessed to several murders in Chi-
cago, which was very convenient for the police.42 But on habeas corpus
in federal court, it was demonstrated the defendant could not have
committed several of the murders he confessed to. That case clearly
demonstrated the great benefit of exploration of the facts by an inde-
pendent federal tribunal unaffected by local considerations.
Local considerations do enter judicial proceedings; we cannot gain-
say that. In Fort Lauderdale, I see judges are elected. And I see by
38. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
39. Id. at 659 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
40. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
41. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).42. Id. at 307.
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their ads they also want to be reelected. Those judges cannot always
provide a full safeguard of our Constitutional rights, and that is true all
the way up to the highest court in the state. Federal review limited to
certiorari is not always adequate because the full record may not have
been developed. In Townsend we had the court record and we had evi-
dence not present in state court, that the defendant was out of the state
when several of the murders were committed.
The next area of difference between the Warren and Burger
Courts is racial segregation. The Warren Court said, in Brown v.
Board of Education," separate can never be equal. In the history of
our country that was repeatedly demonstrated. Law schools were an
early example: it was proved they were not equal. 4" At the time Texas
had no black law school and sent blacks out of the state, which is un-
thinkable today. 5  The Court found such an arrangement
unconstitutional.
We were always unanimous in civil rights cases during my period
and during most of the Warren Court period. We thought it important
to strive for a consensus, knowing racial matters create high emotions.
The present court is widely divided which I regret. It means the public
understandably becomes confused. For example, the issues of busing
schoolchildren to the suburbs and the associated zoning and tax ques-
tions are now in confusion. Citizens' civil rights are losing their solid
protection because the old unanimity which carried great weight has
been lost.
One of the principal shifts in judicial policy I regret to find hap-
pening on the Burger Court is the reemergent use of legal fictions. The
question of standing is a good example. When I was on the Court, a
criminal died in prison. His children wanted to continue his lawsuit to
vindicate the reputation of their father. Realistically, if a father has
committed a crime, his reputation does reflect on the children: Whether
we like it or not, the sins of the father are visited on the children. We
held the children could continue the suit.4 The old rule, that death
ended standing, was overruled. The Warren Court saw the children had
43. 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
44. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
45. Id. at 631-33.
46. Wetzel v. Ohio, 371 U.S. 62 (1962).
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a stake; they would argue vigorously against the state and thus the
adversary system was served.
Now there is a resurrection of defining standing narrowly. Courts
use various tests for standing, all lawyer's jargon. To me standing
should be defined as it was in the Warren period. Does the person have
a real stake in the outcome of the case? Will his stake compel him to
present the adversary position? There's no need for all the other jargon.
Professor Wisotsky: A moment ago you referred to the added
weight a unanimous decision carries. In the famous 1954 school deseg-
regation case of Brown v. Board of Education,47 Chief Justice Warren
was said to have lobbied the other Justices to achieve a unanimous
opinion. In contrast, the fragmentation of the Burger Court is widely
criticized. In another race case, Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,48 with six separate opinions, the so-called opinion of the
Court by Justice Powell speaks only for himself. Would you comment
upon the qualities of leadership a Chief Justice should have and com-
pare the leadership qualities of Chief Justices Warren and Burger.
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I strongly doubt Warren did much lobby-
ing. I was not on the Court at the time; but lobbying is generally not
very effective in the Supreme Court. The Justices of the Court are
pretty independent-minded people, and ought to be. I think the consen-
sus developed in Brown v. Board of Education was not the result of
lobbying. It was the result of a common realization the time had come
to overrule the separate but equal rule of Plessy v. Ferguson,49 to re-
move the blight of racial segregation from our society.
Going beyond your question for a moment, it has been said the
decision has not really been effective in integrating schools. There is
some merit in that position, considering the flight to the suburbs and so
on. But what is overlooked is the impact of the decision in eliminating
segregation in many other aspects of our society and in various sections
of the country. Interestingly enough, the impact may have been greater
in the South than in the North. I have a farm in Virginia, and in the
local area there was a black school and a white school. That duplica-
tion of facilities was eliminated. Since busing is natural in an agricul-
47. 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
48. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
49. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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tural community, everybody is now bused to one high school.
In Watson v. City of Memphis,"° we held that all public facilities
must be desegregated. Today that would seem to be obvious. But the
Supreme Court later heard an important case where the issue was
raised again in Mississippi. 1 I thought we decided the issue, but appar-
ently not directly. The city desegregated all public facilities, as di-
rected, but closed the swimming pool. Obviously the closing was ra-
cially motivated; but the city council claimed they hadn't the money to
run the pool or things like that. So the situation still exists.
There's a lot written about Brown, so I would like to emphasize it
hasn't achieved the total objective. But as to racial matters, I would
like to compare our country today, with all its shortcomings, with what
it was when Brown was decided. It's a tremendous diference and a
great step forward.
As far as comparing Chief Justices Warren and Burger, I can't
judge. I'm not on the Court now and I haven't experienced Burger's
leadership style. But the question relates to what I said about the inde-
pendence of Justices. I think the public and maybe the academicians
place too much stress on leadership. The Chief Justice is only first
among equals. He has the same voice; he has the same vote. He can
assign opinions if he's in the majority, and he runs the building and
presides over the judicial conference. Beyond that he doesn't affect the
vote or views of any member of the Court. Based on my own experi-
ence, I didn't see any ability to affect Justices in the Warren Court,
and I have the greatest admiration and affection and love for Chief
Justice Warren.52
Professor Marsel: You said Justices were very independent; and
50. 373 U.S. 526 (1963). Justice Goldberg believes that the crucial difference
between Watson, and Brown, is that the Goldberg opinion in Watson demanded deseg-
regation for "the here and now," 373 U.S. at 533, while the Warren opinion in Brown
laid down the less stringent standard of desegregation with "all deliberate speed". 349
U.S. at 301.
51. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). •
52. He was my 'dear' friend. When the Harvard Law Review published our vot-
ing records, Warren and I voted together more than most Justices. Note, The Supreme
Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 183 (1964); Note, The Supreme Court, 1964
Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 109 (1965).
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Justice Powell has said there are nine small law firms at the Court.53
When you were serving, did you get to know your colleagues well, both
as men and jurists?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Powell's assessment was right in one re-
spect and wrong in another. I have been senior partner of a law firm
with 180 lawyers, and I have run a small firm. A large firm is a con-
glomerate. A case revolves around a senior partner, with the aid of a
junior partner and a few associates. This group handles the case
throughout; consultation about the case with other partners is minimal
if it exists at all.
The Court has increased the number of law clerks, creating more
of a law office atmosphere. But a Justice does his work alone. He did it
alone in the Warren era, he does it alone in the Burger era. Once he
has an assignment, he works on an opinion and circulates it to see if he
can keep his majority.
There's one great difference between a law firm and the Court
which Powell overlooked: the judicial conference. In a law firm the
partners don't sit down together to vote on how to handle a case. I
think Powell overlooked that when he made the comparison.
Professor Marsel: Mr. Justice, I understand Florida is a state in
the forefront of the movement to allow cameras in the courtroom.
What do you think of this practice and what effect do you think it has
on the jurisprudence of courts?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I have been opposed to using cameras in
the courtroom ever since I was on the Warren Court; all of us were
opposed at that time including Chief Justice Warren." Our reason was
not any hostility to television. In fact we made it clear television report-
ers could stand outside and interview people; we would not interfere
with that.55 Our basic reason for banning cameras was to insure the
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial.
Everybody who participates in a trial is human. Judges are
human; prosecutors are human; defense lawyers are human; witnesses
are human; jurors are human. The net result of permitting televising
53. Powell, What Justices Are Saying, 62 A.B.A.J. 1454 (1976).
54. FLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Cannon 3-A(7) (1973); Petition of Post-News-
week Stations of Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
55. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965).
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from a courtroom, in my opinion, is to convert a solemn trial into
entertainment.
Television is essentially an entertainment industry; television offi-
cials would readily concede that. A trial is not entertainment. It's seri-
ous business.
Viewing broadcasts of actual events is interesting for the people. I
am in favor of televising the legislature because that does not involve
any Constitutional inhibition. But in a courtroom, we can endanger a
Constitutional protection: fair trials.
We do not want to encourage people to play act; it would have
serious consequences on the legal system. We want to insure that the
jury is primarily a group of men and women who apply the law given
them by the judge, who decide the case according to the law and the
evidence.. We don't sequester all juries, and jurors talk to their neigh-
bors afterwards. Jurors don't want to look like soft-hearted knee-jerk
liberals. We don't want to put them in a position where they will decide
cases on the basis of neighborhood approval.
The same is true of judges. And witnesses too, once they take the
stand, know, even if they have not been told, the camera is focused on
them. So they also tend to act.
In my view a trial is not acting; it is serious busines.
Professor Burns: Mr. Justice, which decisions do you believe
were the most important of the Warren era?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: Of course, you have to start with Brown v.
Board of Education56 as a landmark decision, followed by Reynolds v.
Sims, 57 the reapportionment case, and Gideon v. Wainwright,58 estab-
lishing the right of counsel-and injecting a concept whose scope is still
unrealized: the extent to which poverty is an element in equal protec-
tion and due process.
I would say those three; and then a fourth, the Colorado River
controversy.59 That case looms so large because it shows the power of
the Court. Seven of us heard the case. 0 I thought to myself, "this case
56. 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
57. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
58. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
59. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), reh'g denied, 374 U.S. 819
(1963).
60. Chief Justice Warren did not participate because he had been Governor of
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represents the essence of our system." California, one of the biggest
states of the union, Arizona, one of the smallest, and others, a total of
eleven states were submitting to seven fallible people the question of
allotment of the waters of the Colorado River. My reading, later con-
firmed by my international experience, showed water rights are respon-
sible for most wars in recent times. Yet it was accepted that these
seven men would determine the question. We split four to three, so four
members of the Court decided it. I have always regarded that case to
be symbolically one of the most important decisions of the Court.
Professor Marsel: As you look back over the many opinions you
wrote, sir, which do you think was the most significant?
Mr. Justice Goldberg: I would say Griswold.61 I feel strongly I
was right in my concurring opinion. The area of privacy is protected by
the ninth amendment; it's important to reassert that and extend it to
the fundamental rights not specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. I think that's right historically and right on its merits.
I think Bell v. Maryland62 was an important decision. I believe the
right of equal accomodations for Americans rests on the Constitution.
We did not need a statute to that end, although fortunately Congress
did pass the statute.63 But I thought the whole constitutional concept of
equal protection afforded every American the right to equal accommo-
dations. And Watson v. City of Memphis,64 desegregating public facili-
ties, was important.
My opinion in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez65 demonstrated our
quest for legal realities, saying "forget the symbols". Academicians ar-
gued about what constituted a sanction. But a man was automatically
stripped of his citizenship because he fled the draft; I said it was uncon-
stitutional, a terrible sanction. If the government must act, indict the
person for draft evasion, a criminal violation, and let him make a de-
fense. I also said in that case that the Constitution is not a suicide
California; Justice White disqualified himself because his law firm had handled part of
the case.
61. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
62. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
63. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1964); 42
U.S.C. § 1971 (1964); §§ 1975a-1975d (1964); §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1964)).
64. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
65. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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pact;66 it affords Americans protections even during periods of national
emergency. The Court said as much in Ex parte Milligan,17 where it
stopped President Lincoln from suspending the writ of habeas corpus in
the District of Columbia in the middle of the Civil War.
Interestingly enough, I thought the opinion I wrote in United
States v. Barnett8 was important. I didn't like Barnett, I felt he was.a
racist governor. He denied James Meredith admission to Mississippi
State University, violating an injunction, and was held in criminal con-
tempt for doing so. I said he was entitled to a jury trial, but could only
get three other votes. Stripping fictions aside, my view was he would go
to jail, thus the Constitutional protections should apply. I recalled some
communists who jumped bail under the Smith Act and were sentenced
to longer sentences for criminal contempt than they would have been
under the statute for skipping bail. 9 I thought it was an important
distinction to make. The court has pretty well adopted it now, but they
did not adopt it then. °
Dean Lewis: Mr. Justice, we appreciate very much your willing-
ness to share your insights with us. Thank you.
66. Id. at 160.
67. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
68. 376 U.S. 681, 728 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 739-40.
70. E.g., Codspotti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
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